Railway Signaling Systems Insights Post Coromandel Express Accident

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BUT WHAY ACD ? IN ATS SYSTEM MUST BE MECHENICAL INTER LOCKING FIRST WORK THEN ELECTRIC INTERLOCKING WORK MEACENICAL INTER LOCKING IS FAILL THEN ALL SYSTEM IS OFF POSTATION . TUNG RAIL TO MAIN RAIL MECHENICAL CONNECTION MAKE BREAK SWITCHING IS WORKING . THEN POINT MOTOR OPERATIONAL POSTATION .

Nice 👍👍

Your explanation, and your english... Is excellent... 👌👌👌👌👌

Very good content for knowledge.. but please change the narrator.. because of extremely poor pronunciation it sounds very bad

never learn english from this video

Bro your bengali accent English is to a next level ....!

Loop line and main line on same signal??

👌👌👌🇮🇳

I object !

If the Train wants to change track then the signal should be Caution Signal with Home Signal at above

Loop line pe 2aspect signal me green and red shown in video. .how this possible

Before implementing these grand schemes like Amrit Bharat Station Scheme, the Modi government should immediately constitute a joint parliament committee to review the passenger safety standards of the Indian Railways and recommend short & long term corrective action. The common man is now afraid to travel by rail as unlike the Indian Railways, he values his own life therefore demands information on the status of CBI investigation report on Coromandel Express disaster which took place on the 2nd of June, at Bahanaga Bazar railway station, Balasore, why is it taking CBI so long to complete the investigation and release their Report, when will the Indian Railways release the CSR report on the Coromandel Express accident, when will the Indian Railways release their investigation reports related to several accidents and near miss incidents which had taken place within close proximity of the Coromandel Express disaster, some of which are listed below as following:-
(a) On 5th June 2013 - Dibrugarh-Kanyakumari Vivek Express collided with a goods-carrying vehicle at an unauthorised rail crossing in Assam's Golaghat district on near Chungjan railway station at around 5.30 a.m. The railways were extremely lucky that there were no casualties although the collision incident highlights very poor safety standards which we are trying to highlight to all and sundry as systemic failure.
Why did the Station Master of Chungjan Railway Station not follow safety procedures in notifying the Railway Safety Officer, local police and the local councillor of this potential hazard within his jurisdiction as it was obvious that this section of the railway track was open to intermittent traffic therefore high risk for a collision incident to take place therefore seems highly irregular that there was NIL action taken in order to mitigate this risk. Its standard for the Indian Railways to blame the vehicle driver for this accident and close the case without any root cause investigating as to why appropriate measures for either permanently closing the access points of this unauthorised railway crossing OR installing manned level crossing at site were not initiated by the Station Master and why were temporary safety precautions were not initiated by the Station Master by simply alerting Loco Pilot on Walkie Talkie of the location of this unauthorised crossing, ensuring Loco Pilot followed the standard procedures for passing through an unmanned railway crossing on reducing speed with fog lights on and continuous sounding of the electric horn ensuring a close look out is maintained as these procedures would have surely prevented this collision. The present high-risk status of this unauthorised rail crossing is unknown until we receive the Investigation Report from the Railways
(b) On 25th June, two goods train collided on the loop line causing derailment of 14 bogies & major damage to loco, at Ondagram railway station, Bankura district, West Bengal and again the Indian Railways were lucky that there was no casualty since both were goods train because if the incomcommon ing train was a passenger express, we would be looking at another Coromandel Express disaster due to the sheer impact of the collision and extent of damage to the bogies. Again the Indian Railways have blamed the loco pilot of the incoming freight train under SPAD due to " micro sleeping" and sacked both loco pilot and assistant loco pilot and closed the case in a hurry without necessary root cause investigation as to why both loco & assistant loco were sleeping on duty ? there are several questions that remain unanswered regarding the action of the Station Master or duty officer and including serious doubts on status of the signalling system. The Investigation report is pending as believe this remains incomplete.
(c) On 18th July, a Memu train managed a narrow escape near Baruna Singh chhak at Nilgiri Road railway station in Odisha s Balasore district. The train was mistakenly allowed to enter a loop line track where some maintenance work was going on. An alert loco pilot sensed something wrong and immediately applied brakes thereby prevented a major train mishap. This near miss incident highlights "gross negligence" of the Station Master as Standard Safety procedures as required when tracks are under repair were not implemented, i.e., was Disconnection Memo issued and was clamping & pad locking of point carried out, etc. This incident also suggests the possibility of manual tampering of the point signal, like what is suspected as the root cause for allowing the Coromandel Express to enter the loop line and collide with the stationary goods train. The investigation report from the Indian Railways is not yet made public and we believe gross negligence in performing duties is now a systemic problem across the Indian Railways.
We find complacency to have set in within the railway and ministry officials who refuse to see the elephant in the room thereby shying away from taking long term corrective action. It is unfortunate to see the Indian Railways trying their best to cover up cases of gross negligence and as usual busy in "shoving relevant information under the carpet" and away from the glare of media attention. We would like to see a rigorous and regular regime of internal and external auditing of the Quality Management System as it seems that there are no real checks and balances in order to ensure continual improvement of customer satisfaction which believe one of the root cause for such dismal record on passenger safety and its rather pathetic to realize the fact that we are all OK for the common man to keep paying with his life whenever gross negligence is committed by the Indian Railways. In context, the Chinese are now decades ahead with high speed rail tracks now networked across the length and breadth of their country with the intention of operating the Maglev at service speeds of 430 kmph, therefore if we are to compete it is imperative to initiate massive infrastructure development schemes and develop a Safety Management System for the Indian Railways that can raise and maintain the bar on performance quality OR the Govt should seriously consider immediate options to privatise certain sections of the Indian Railways. Also, its high time for the central government to nominate a dedicated Union Minister only for the Indian Railways and frankly it s a matter of concern that the plight of the Indian Railways is yet to be brought up during the monsoon session of parliament. It s equally pathetic to see how the Indian press & digital media now only seem to focus on Breaking News, conveniently suffering from amnesia where sustained media attention is essential to catalyse the civil society to react in a manner that can drive change.

Your explained wrong way ..loopline don't have green signal it has yellow and re only..

pls give some info about calling indicator signal .. and more about silver cross mark on the top of signal post ,,,,

Bhi Hindi me bhi bat karsakata hai 😢

upni 1kjon bangali ami buja nea6e upnar language suna .

at which software can we get such animations..

Video realy use full ❤

Game name pls 🙏

Basis piecemeal information reported by the news media on the CRS investigation report on the Coromandel Express disaster , it would seem that the automatic interlocking system was compromised since 2018 until the accident occurred on 2nd June 2023, due to some blotched up repair on facing point machine by sectional engineers from the Signal Dept and as incredible as it may sound, it seems that this team comprising of the Snr Sectional Engineer, Jr Sectional Engineer and technician had been discretely tampering with the point switch signal. Hard to believe that these guys never felt the need to rectify the defective point and resorted to an unauthorised stop gap solution, thereby compromising safety, and compounding operational risk for traffic on UP main line for a period of five long years. Its mind boggling to comprehend how these guys could keep on manually tampering with the signalling system without getting caught and sheds some light on the quality of some skilled railwaymen responsible for maintaining safe operation of railway traffic. In this particular case the responsible sectional engineers were fully aware of this discrete "unauthorised tampering" which probably had become a habit since undetected for such a long time. These actions highlight a unsafe team and unfit for purpose, especially since they seemed completely ignorant on how their reckless actions could have compromised safety and unable to comprehend how such compromised operations with the passage of time was like a ticking time bomb ready to explode. We should take note that its only because of the high number of fatalities, skeletons in the closet are being uncovered and in context on 25th June there was another similar collision incident involving two goods train causing derailment of 12 bogies took place at Ondagram railway station, Bankura, West Bengal and although no fatalities this major incident bears significance as the sequence of events leading to the incident very similar to the Coromandel Express disaster. The railway authorities now claim that the Bankura goods train accident was due to both loco driver and the assistant loco driver of moving goods train were ' micro sleeping" therefore brakes was not applied causing the train overshoot and collide with a stationary train. The railway inquiry team concluded declaring the loco driver and assistant driver as the guilty party as they were " micro sleeping" on duty and unable to apply brakes before the red home signal thereby overshooting and colliding with stationary train on loop line. Although both injured loco drivers were hospitalised after the collision, the railways have been rather quick to sack both drivers as charged with sole responsibility of causing the accident not having checked/ confirmed these drivers work schedule complies with minimum rest hours and have conveniently closed out the case without any further investigation which leaves several pending questions unanswered as to why the duty officer in control room was not monitoring the incoming goods train and why he was not able to alert the loco driver on walkie talkie, why was this incoming goods train not cleared for the main line with green home signal after resetting the point switch to normal position since the stationary goods was parked on the loop line , instead providing red home signal when there was nil reported obstruction on up main line, Was any anti-collision device fitted on these goods trains as there must be remote emergency stop function as a contingency in case the loco pilot gets incapacitated or falls asleep due to insufficient rest hours which is now a fairly common phenomenon due to shortage of skilled man power and has contributed to a systemic rise the number of accidents and near misses thereby compromising on safety.
We have listed a few important comments highlighting concerns of the common man on the loss of nearly 300 innocent lives due to sheer negligence therefore feel extremely insecure to travel by rail. .
a) The automatic interlock system which is basically a safety device for railway operations was compromised since 2018, i.e. for five years until this accident occurred,
b) The signalling system had lost its automatic online status due to the manual fingering of the system by the engineers. As per media, CRS reports suggests tampering of the signal system based on the statement of Mr Mohanta, Senior Sectional Engineer that immediately after the accident, he had rushed over to the control room to find the point signal still indicating Green when in fact the collision and derailment had led to railway tracks being ripped open leaving the point machine completely destroyed, therefore suggesting this was a dummy signal from external source. This suggestion makes sense if we consider the operation of this point switch was being manually manipulated ever since blotched repair in 2018. Considering the last set position of the point switch was in Reverse direction with point signal Yellow, thereby allowing the goods train to enter Up loop line in order to clear the Up main line for incoming Up Coromandel Express. We are also aware of the ongoing works for the past few days for renewal of the automatic boom barrier at the unmanned railway crossing located a fair distance away from the point switch. We are now assuming that in order to function test the boom barrier, the automatic interlock system was logically sequenced for boom barrier to close only when the facing point switch was set at Normal position to main line, i.e. Green point signal, therefore when function testing boom barrier, the same reckless team of signal engineers & technician engaged in yet another unsafe act of manually bypassing the point signal from Yellow to Green. Basis available information seems the unauthorised tampering was carried out from nearby junction box and probably due to time constraints and the inconvenient distance separating the boom barrier and the point switch.
(c) Indian Railways require every railway station to carry an updated and approved version of the SWR and the SWRD. The SWR or Safe Working Rule book, is issued every 5 years and signed by Sr DOM and Sr DSTE and is the official book of rules and regulations issued for the purpose of the safe operations of trains under normal and abnormal conditions, customised to suit a particular railway station with the updated version of the SWRD or Safe Working Rule Diagram providing location details of signalling systems, interlocking systems, relay room, signalling equipment, etc. Specific procedures for working on boom barrier at level crossing are detailed under an appendix listed in the SWR which also includes the job description of he station master and his team therefore requires all parties to go through the SWR & the SWRD and sign confirming their understanding of their job descriptions and with standard operating procedures under normal / abnormal conditions which should serve as reference material for CBI in order to verify compliance. Media reports on existing plans not updated to include system modifications insinuates the SWRD not being updated for which the Sr DOM, Sr DSTE and their superiors should be held directly responsible.
(d) These sectional engineers and the technician from signal dept were an unsafe bunch, not fit for purpose, capable of only " jugaar" and as they lacked the knowledge and skill set to understand the inherent risk and the possible outcome of highly unprofessional behaviour.
(e) Since the same team members from the signal engineering department was responsible for the routine inspections and checks, planned maintenance and major overhaul of all signalling equipment and systems, we can safely assume that SBR was ignored thereby increasing the risk of equipment / system failure.
(f) It seems highly improbable that the Station Master and the Assistant Station Manager were completely ignorant of the fact that their technical support teams could tamper around with signalling system and able to hide these blotched up repairs. It’s very evident that they regularly ignored tell-tale signs and red alerts and did not themselves comply to standard operating procedures provided under the SBR. It’s obvious that they were not monitoring the repair & maintenance being undertaken within their jurisdiction as procedures under SBR requires them to witness the final testing & commissioning to their satisfaction prior signing the re-connection memo therefore either they were privy to these blotched repairs or contrary to standard procedures they personally never attended which complemented the unsafe practices being undertaken.
(g) There was another major incident involving collision of two goods train resulting in serious damage to property including the derailment of 12 bogies at Ondagram railway station, Bankura district on the 25th June 2023, and the incident has been closed in a unsatisfactory manner which requires the railways to come up with several unanswered questions as it seems a deliberately exercise to quickly and quietly close out the incident.

As a maritime consultant, i have been involved with Major Incident investigations within the marine industry and have been following media reports on this unfortunate incident and have also been sharing my comments after filtering out media clutter. As events have unfolded, the story developing seems all too familiar as i suspect that this incident is deeply routed and there would be a chain of relatively minor incidents and near misses that would lead up for this particular major incident to occur. An audit of the Quality Management System of the Indian Railways would most likely highlight major non conformities including non compliance of Standard Operating Procedures. The fact that there was a Disconnection Memo & Reconnection Memo issued by the Station Master, we are assuming that the railways team had become aware that there was some problem with the facing point machine on up-loop line x-over and basis the high risk status, a Disconnection Memo was issued by declaring the point Failed, requiring immediate repair & maintenance. The was a serious breach in the implementation of standard operating procedures after issuing the Disconnection Memo until issuance of the Re-connection Memo because if procedures as laid down by the Indian Railways was followed with due diligence this unfortunate incident would never have taken place. In context, the standard operating procedures require that maintenance repair or replacement of the point is carried out by a joint team comprising of experienced personnel from the engineering & signalling dept under the station masters command. Standard practice after boxing up the point and reconnecting the terminal wiring, testing and commissioning requires the point to be function tested from Normal locked position to Reverse locked position and vice versa, ensuring point gets locked at each end position, i.e. tongue rail makes full contact with the stock rail which requires total travel distance of tongue rail to be measured for a pre-determined value and if required the throw slide of the machine is adjusted after confirming self-locking of lock slides at its end positions. During these tests, the point is operated locally by hand cranking the manual lever and thereafter the remote operation is checked from control room. AS PER IR RULES, IT IS MANDATORY FOR STATION MASTER TO BE PHYSICALLY PRESENT AT LOCAL SITE TO WITNESS TESTING OF THE POINT, AND ONCE SATISFIED WITH FUNCTION TESTING OF POINT AND SIGNALLING SYSTEM, the station manager is then able to issue a re-connection memo.
We are in the dark on the nature of "repairs effected", and what was the specific reason (why, when and for how long) for issuing a Connection & Re-Connection Memo because this signifies an abnormal condition which would affect up main line traffic therefore timings for issual of these memos would be a source of key information. Normally for failed point, the complete point machine should be replaced with a new spare machine.
The time re-connection memo was issued and ETA ( estimated time of arrival )of UP Coromandel Express would also shed some light if the repairs were undertaken under stress as working under tight schedules, there is always the temptation to take short cuts and a tendency to overlook basics, therefore we cannot eliminate the possibility of incorrect wiring connections made after boxing up the point machine, effectively reversing the contact terminals for a given position, i.e. when the point was mechanically locked at the Normal position, the feedback signal indicated the Reverse position and vice versa. There is a always a possibility for basic mistakes to go undetected especially when working under tight schedule which could have led to the disaster. In context, there was media reports regarding ongoing renewal of the electric barrier at the level x-ing however contrary to several opinions, as a layman's inference, cannot see this as root cause of the incident because as per logical sequence this electric barrier unit should serve as an interlock for the two mail lines irrespective of the position of the point.

Abe angrej ki aulad Hindi mein bol Hindi

A couple of corrections (though let me know if I am mistaken, as I am familiar with UK practice as opposed to Indian practice - but I presume they are very similar):

1. A route indicator must be proven lit before a proceed aspect can be shown so that the driver knows which route they will be taking and can adjust their speed accordingly (to avoid potential derailment). In this video the junction signal shows a proceed aspect prior to the route indicator being lit.

2. A double yellow should never be followed immediately by a red signal, as shown early on in the video. The aspect sequence for 4 aspect signalling is G-YY-Y-R. In fact, regardless of whether it is 2, 3, or 4 aspect signalling, the signal immediately before a red signal must always show a single yellow. The example at the end was correct however!

3. When a train passes a signal, the signal should almost always immediately return to red once the wheels pass the detection point associated with that signal (the exception to this being the use of last wheel replacement) in order to protect the rear of the train from any other train following it. In the video the signals remain at proceed even when the entire train passes.

Viewers please don't use this to start piloting trains please. For Coromandel Sake

In my view the driver of coromandel train see segnal only half portion the green one but not see another half the side signal that's why the accident happened

This. Ur right vidio speed lup line accident

Nice animation and explanation

What was the case in Coromondal Express dated 2/6/2023? The signal was green and the point/home switch set to loop line. How?

Mistake by ciliated freind

Sorry kala lite I don't know but confused All so Way

But fail this system loophole is system

Hindi translation bhi kar diya karo

Sir, Which software do you use?

I always got amazed by seeing multiple signals in track during journey, today I got to know the reason behind it....!!!... THANK YOU....!!!🙂😊

Very educative video abt signalling.Hats off to u.

First provide Kavach Anti collision device in all indian railways trains.

Who the hell is briefing.. Just look at his orating capability..

Mr Narrator you have given one wrong ihfor mation to the viewers when a train is taken to the loop line by the ca bin master point to be adjusted and the lights of the signals will be yelliw in the middle and 3 to 4 small iights show ing side towords loop line But your animation showing signal at the top of the post Rectify it

Nice

Pronounce the words properly..........

Are you bengalee?

Which software is using for animation please share name

Abe over smart donkey k bachche 🤬😡🤬
Sidhi excent me video nahi bana sakta kya??