Do Ships/Yachts Have Anti Collision Technology? | SY News Ep458

Perhaps because they had such flammable cargo they were asked to anchor outwith the normal area?

Thanks for the excellent explanation of collision avoidance systems.

Was the captain of the Solong related to Joseph Hazelwood?

As a Russian, the captain will receive "strong justice"???Commercial pressures, placed on him by the management company, won't matter either?????

I would think that when there is a lot of traffic and somewhat limited visibility you would definitely want to have two people on the bridge and the AIS active so you don't overlook or misjudge a potentially dangerous situation. Out on the distant ocean I could understand not needing AIS; in other words: quite the opposite to heavy traffic.

Was the Stena Immaculate actually anchored where it was directed? Can you measure the distance from the float light, please? Thank you.

so no yacht news ?

We live nearby and heard and saw nothing of this incident. However, from the shore it’s not possible to see just how busy the Humber and its environs is. The maritime online charts we get to see don’t seem to show the channels into and out of the Humber although its possible even from the shore to appreciate that vessels going into the Humber use the port channel (being a lubber I mean the left hand channel.😮). Thanks for an interesting presentation.

Excellent video sysmam really well covered, the outer anchorage seems a bit of a concern though

Yes. They have crew.

From a former Navigating Officer of Super Tankers this incident is nothing but pure negligence on the part of the Captain of Solong. The tanker was instructed where to anchor and did so, the lack of a person on the bridge at the time is not really relevant the anchor watch person could have been patrolling the decks and checking the lay of the anchor with regard to tide and currents. Sole responsibility for this accident is on the Solong, they were travelling at excessive speed for the conditions, without a properly manned bridge and following a predetermined course (obviously followed many times before) without due regard for the situation around the entrance to a major shipping port. They were also going to cross a traffic separation route which would have involved vessels entering and leaving the port, therefore putting themselves in the position of dodging vessels from both port and starboard of their track.

Let's have a comment on more of a question. Would it be normal to have a watch stander under instruction and a senior officer, doubling as both instructor and dedicated lookout?

thankyou for the updates

A security system that is frequently and casually disabled because of too many false alarms is not a security system. Suspect MAIB may have comments on practice of dsabling it.
Also, while you provided some of the comms to the tanker telling it where to park, we would need to know about communicatiosn to the Solong. Consider for instance if the captain of Solong was told by the same people who told the Tanker where to park that they could use this lane without problem with no traffic in the way? Such a communication would reduce the blame/incompetence of the Solong captain and shift some blame to traffic controllers. On other hand, if the Solong was warned of parked ships in that lane, then the blame/incompetence level increases for the Solong captain.

Seems to me, albeit a layman, that a ship travelling at 16kt with no lookout on a patchy/foggy day is wholly responsible for hitting another ship that's not underway 'cos it's anchored. Simple as. I'd suggest that as they'd done the same passage many times, it was a 'routine voyage' and complacency had set in.

Thank you for the detail. The consequences of a mistake are sad.

I find it inconceivable that vessels don't have personnel assigned to watch duties, particularly if one's vessel is an aviation fuel tanker!

This is even more important if traversing or moored in a high traffic area!

Given the plethora of electronic aids to inform the bridge crew of the course, speed, and position of vessels in one's vicinity, it appears that it would only take a major act of dereliction of duty for a collision to occur between two modern vessels.

Given the risks to life that such a collision would create, it surely becomes a matter of urgency to ensure that personnel are always on watch duty.

Radar should be able to see right through that fog. AIS can tell you where every vessel in the area is. Clearly Solong is responsible.
Anchor watch on the Stena Immaculate if they'd seen the Stella heading towards them could've flashed all the ship's lights, sounded a horn, and used VHF Emergency Channel to either hail the ship by name or "Pan pan! pan pan! pan pan! Fast moving ship on a SSE course you are on a collision course." (If they'd said "allision course.' I know I wouldn't know what he was talking about.)
Everything in the animated diagrams on your video was available in both ships at the time of the accident.

Aviation collision warnings do not work below a certain altitude because the actual height above ground could vary enough because of the barometric setting that it could send one plane into the ground. (This was an mentioned in the reports on the military helicopter that collided with the passenger jet in Washington DC)

On a sailboat which averaged over three months 4.5 knots, we set our AIS alarm distance at 5 or 10 nautical miles. Large ships can be moving at 10 to over 20 knots, though I think 12 - 14 knots was more standard. We want to make sure we have plenty of time to change our course, (even if we are under sail and are the Stand On Vessel. What's easy for us is more expensive and more difficult for large ships.)

The AIS system (Automatic Identification System, required on all large ships, optional on small boats) transmits name, speed, heading, and other information like destination. This appears on our chartplotter as a symbol. We can then click on the symbol and the (B&G) software will tell us what our closet approach will be and how soon that will occur. It also clearly states if there is a collision possibility. We set the closet approach warnings for that too. Usually a mile. We have to figure out if we'll be in front or behind the other vessel, when we are closest, but that isn't difficult. If it says less than a mile, we will usually alter our course.

When we alter our course as a courtesy and safety margin, we will always do it by at least 4 or 5 degrees. This shows up on the other vessel's chartplotter as a clear change of direction. They now know we are aware, being being extra careful and courteous. Make your intentions clearly apparent is one of the USCoast Guard Rules. Sometimes this can be with a horn.

If we were just at anchor we might not have these systems turned on. Large ships I would expect would... but I don't know. If we were in the way of a large vessel they would blow their horn, flash the lights on and off, and call us up on Channel 16. I think this indicates that the ship at anchor didn't have an active watch. And whoever was the watch on the Solong was also not paying attention.
Air traffic control is not really needed for ships outside a port. With all the traffic in that area and no other accidents, clearly the current systems are very good.
I would expect that a collision alarm would be easily turned off once the watch looked at the chartplotter/radar and determined there was no risk. So I can't see someone disabling it because it was annoying. (Still with computer stuff.... Do we really need to be interrupted by our car's nav system every minute or two, "You are on the best route to reach your destination."?)

I find this subject endlessly fascinating. There's an amazing book that compares Avoidable Medical Error in the U.S. with Commercial Aviation safety. Tens of thousands of people die every year from avoidable medical error, while flying at 35,000 at 500 miles an hour is one of the safest things we can do. There are very clear and compelling reasons for this. I probably would not have become a sailor twenty years ago. Two years ago, sail across the Pacific? Sure why not. Starlink, SatPhones, Radar, Predict Wind, AIS, Radar, GPS...

Yeah it's called Mark 10 eyeballs.

we pilots function with altitude separation which works fine… altitude seperation with ships would be…. well, somethings gone horribly wrong (if not one is a submarine)…. cleared to land (doing north of 70kts) is also bit different

I sure hope he wasn't trying to find a song on his cassette deck

pilot deviation… human performance… there are several books written

Someone will correct you even if you are right. 😄

Yeah they do ,,,,,it’s called wheel watch………….

Do ship owners lock down settings such as alarms so the crew cant disable them ? Interesting plots of prior passages, it was a well known area for course modifications. Steaming at 16kn in poor visibility without sufficient bridge crew responding to collision alarms would be reckless. I dont have charts but would another 10miles offshore be a more direct route to Rotterdam, and avoid this busy zone ?

It’s sadly another case of complacency. The Solomg crew had traversed the route so many times it became routine. In that routine it’s easy to fall into the trap that every evolution is going to be the same. It is incredibly fortunate that only one soul was lost in such a horrific accident.

Good luck. Thank you, and keep working.

Without knowing much I wonder if, due to fatigue, someone simply fell asleep on the job.

Had there been any last second coarse change one might suggest just too fast for visibility but without that.... no one on watch.

Switching off AIS and associated alarms in a dense traffic system is total nonsense, sorry. This situation is when you need it!

My comment is this:
Thank YOU so much for bringing us up to date, professional, and very informative information!
Much Respect!

It is my opinion that the radar and AIS probably showed there was going to be a collision for over an hour. The AIS and radar have a range of over 20 miles.

bad stuff when the captains are bad.

Many many thanks for the update report and comments. Very useful and hopefully help to better understand situation to those who interesting.

Below is my comment to the event, which has been published right after the disaster on the channel of "What's Going With Shipping" driven by Sal Mercogliano:

"The most likely picture is this: the captain himself was on watch on the bridge of the container ship. Since there are apparently only 3 navigators on this ship: the captain, the chief officer and the 2nd mate. The watch of 2nd mate from 1200-1600, the watch of the chief officer from 1600- 2000 hours. This means that the captain was on the bridge of the vessel and was engaged in other matters, rather than proper lookout and handling of the vessel".

So, nearly corresponds to MAIB report.

With all the electronic aids is there not a system that indicates a collision coarse to the coast guard/monitoring body, in the same way as air traffic control? or is it solely the responsability of the ship's captain/navigator/crew?

You seem to be referring to collision warning systems based on radar, which would be subject to false alarms in crowded seas and missed alarms in rough seas. But the aviation systems are based on GPS beacons with each plane continuously broadcasting its GPS position and identity. Ships clearly have these beacons since anybody can get apps for their phones which display the information. The question is, why is THIS information not leveraged effectively for collision avoidance in ships as it is in aircraft which, as you point out, is a much harder problem? Monitoring this information on individual ships and/or by shore based traffic control authorities ought to enable collision dangers to be detected well in advance. Autopilot systems ought to be able to respond automatically if warnings are ignored by crew.

TCAS will issue traffic advisories (TA) and resolution advisories (RA), when appropriate, essentially when aircraft are getting too close. TA's provide information that another aircraft is nearby. RA's are mandatory and indicate to the pilot what avoidance action is required. RA's are inhibited below 1,000 ft. TA's are inhibited below 500 ft or 400 ft depending on the manufacturer.

I have a question assuming the captain is found guilty what could the penalty be in relation to his rank. Would he loss hiss master ticket and busted down to a seaman or no longer be employed and have little chance of sailing as part of the senior crew on another boat etc.? Would lLoon's skipper also face similar issue with his ticket and/or employment being a charter boat skipper rather than a Marchant Seaman.

So first of all the shipping company of So Long must be charged for not providing enough personnel for watch keeping. That's probably not possible because it's allowed to go watch schedules of 6 on / 6 off, but it seems it wasn't possible for the crew to have a second person on the bridge. So the question remains, if the company can be charged for that. The necessity of switching the alarm system on needs also to be changed to mandatory.

Yes! COLREGS take note of rule 5

They do once they have a collision they tend not to do it again because they sink

There are too many collision avoidance systems to make this an accident. For a start you will have the MACS system and alarms, the AIS alarm, radar warning alarm, GPS and navigation sensors and infrared sensors and cameras for low visibility, these would all have to be deactivated and no bridge watch. Frankly impossible.

I sailed in late 1974 with a ship that had a Sperry CAS (collision avoidance system). Retired later as a sea captain and now a boater. The technology is very much onboard these days to not have these collision. I cannot see anything but a human error causing this collision.

yes, it's called a helmsman...

Hmm … as a master mariner for over 25 years and insurers lawyer and casulty specialist world wide for over 17 years… I notice some things mentioned. …. 1) a ship at anchor is required by the colregs Part B, section 1 ( conduct in any conditions of visibility) to maintain a proper look out at all times- rule 5. That is a constant watch , one should be watch keeping as underway , ie assessing risk of collision - rule 7, and action to avoid collision -rule 8. It is repeated in Part B, section III -(conduct in restricted visibility) in - rule 19……..2) a ship at anchorage can move to comply with the colregs action to avoid collision, - the quickest method is let the chain off the brake and release the bitter end. If the vessel at anchor cannot get its main engine up immediately for manoeuvring in restricted visibility then they also are negligent because Part B, section iii, rule 19(b)……3) Just because a ship is at anchor the colregs DO NOT excuse an anchored vessel from complying with the Colregs.
4) considering that the visibility was patchy, the colreg rules Part B, section 2 ( conduct when vessel are in sight of one another) still apply when either vessel sees the other visually ( granted very late , may be at 0.5nm) but these rules will also apply ie rule - 15. Crossing, rule 16 action by giveaway vessel, rule 17 action by stand on, and rule 18 responsibility between vessel. Note in rule 18 there is no give way to an anchored vessel. Also if a ship at anchor that cannot manoeuvre immediately as required by rule 19, then that ship at anchor should also be displaying the signals/ sounds for a vessel not under command.( see definition)…… 5) colregs Part C applies to ships in all weathers, these being navigation lights and symbols, so a ship at anchor must display the lights and symbols of rule 30, in addition if it is unable to immediately manoeuvre / or manoeuvre as required by the rules, it must also display the 2 red /2 balls as required in rule 27 (they are not mutual exclusive rules)……. 6) Everyone forgets this, Part D sound and light signals. So when in sight rule 34 applies, and in or near restricted visibility rule 35 applies, Rule 36 applies in all conditions…….finally, at 16knots, the Solong covers 12 nm in 45minutes, and 6nm in about 22minutes. At 12 nm (and definitely at 6nm) its radars (both x band and S band ) would have been detecting the stena ship (with arpa info - it was side on to heading of Solong giving its best radar reflection profile/aspect ), how the captain could go 45 minutes (or even 22minutes ) without becoming aware of the sterna vessel (both on radar , by hearing fog signals, is a gastly long time to not be aware of your ships surroundings. …. 7) finally, in the legal liability proceeding ( as to who pays for the damages, and losses) and to work out who pays what, Humber VTS will be also liable for negligently directing a ship where to anchor out side of it designate area/anchor areas. My guess is that liability hearing will find the responsibility proportions to be about : Solong 48% responsible, Stena vessel 32% responsible and Humber VTS 20% responsible, it will not surprise me if the total liability ( before ship limitation of liability proceeding by both ships) reaches Close to USD $ 700 million)

It's the Captains fault it's his ship end of story.

How big the earths oceans are and these 2 ships are still smaller then grains of sand but still they crash! Smfh

Great reporting . Definitely a poor anchorage choice too . A simple check of previous ais tracks,would have,shown it was,not ideal,. More information needed on that too. Was the fuel cargo part of reason to be directed to anchor there?
Yes we know there,are not good traffic control systems but is now The time to implement active AIS tracking inside 12 mile limit???
Yup more expense ....
Cherrs warren

I am not sure about the exact requirements for the Stena Immaculate, but US flag vessels were required to have Advanced Radar Plotting Aids (ARPA) if the vesselis above 10,000 gross tons, 33CFR164.38. This rule came into effect for all motorized vessels in 1984. This rule basically incorporates Rule 24(b) of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (7 2COLREGS). Appendix B to 164.38 is the US Maritime Administration Collision Avoidance System (CAS) Specifications. The CAS requirements parallel those of 33CFR164.38 for ARPA and 72COLREG Rule 24(b).

These rules cover the equipment but not when the equipment has to be used.

It has been close to 30 years ago, I had the opportunity to spend time some of the Stena operators on one oftheir ferries. If I remember correctly their bridge non-licensed watch standards were ARPA qualified.

It will be interesting to read the MAIB final report. The big question is whether the ARPAs were in use, and if so, what did the watch standards do with the information?😊